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Abstract
In recent decades, issues of corporate accountability and social responsi-
bility have risen to the forefront in international debates. The U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business andHuman Rights (Guiding Principles), unanimously
endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in June 2011, authoritatively
lay out the State duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights. In an effort to operationalize the Guiding Principles, the U.N.
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Human Rights Council called on all States to develop National Action Plans
(NAPs) for domestic implementation of the Guiding Principles. A key first
step in the creation of a NAP is the completion of a national baseline as-
sessment of the current frameworks and conditions affecting the protection
and promotion of human rights by the State and businesses alike. With over
thirty-five countries now committed to the creation of a NAP, it is increas-
ingly important to evaluate existing corporate structures that claim to be
socially and ethically motivated. The “B Corp” movement began in earnest
in 2006, through the work of U.S.-based non-profit B Lab. A B Corp is a
business certified by B Lab as a corporation committed to creating and sup-
porting social and environmental rights. The B Corp movement has grown
in size and stature, spreading into over thirty countries and garnering a rep-
utation for excellence. Boosts to the movement have recently come from the
certification of large multinational companies and the interest of businesses
that followed. As the B Corpmovement continues to proliferate, its technical
and normative value within the business and human rights field merits close
consideration. Through a comparative analysis between the B Corp certifi-
cation requirements and the Guiding Principles, this paper seeks to answer
the following questions: Do B Corps fulfill the Guiding Principles’ corpo-
rate responsibility standards to respect human rights? Are they a desirable
normative shift in the business and human rights context?
A Introduction
For decades, human rights advocates have called for greater corporate account-
ability in relation to the harmful impacts business operations can, and often
do, have on individuals, communities, and societies throughout the world. As
high profile cases of large multinational corporations complicit in human rights
abuses have increasingly come to the fore, the need to clarify both the role of
States to effectively regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) and the stan-
dards of corporate responsibility and accountability with regards to human rights
has become stark.1 The work of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprise, John Ruggie, aimed to address this gap. Over the course of his six-
year mandate, Ruggie established the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (Guiding Principles), a three-pillared framework outlining the
State duty to protect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect hu-
man rights, and the need for access to remedy in relation to business-related
human rights harms.2 The Guiding Principles, comprised of thirty-one founda-
1 Probably the most cited case of corporate complicity in human rights abuse is the Bhopal gas
tragedy of 1984, though calls for an international code of conduct for multinational corporations
began in the mid-seventies. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Address
Delivered by Mr. Salvador Allende Gossens, President of Chile, at the Inaugural Ceremony on 13
April 1973, Apr. 13–May 21, 1972, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. TD/180 (Vol. 1), Annex VIII (1973)
2 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
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tional and operational principles, lay out in authoritative detail, inter alia, the
obligations and responsibilities of State and corporate actors in regards to busi-
ness impacts on human rights.3 The U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously
adopted the Guiding Principles in 2011 and thereafter called on countries in
2014 to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) to promote further implementa-
tion of the Guiding Principles on a domestic scale.4 A key first step in the creation
of a NAP is the completion of a National Baseline Assessment (NBA).5 The NBA
is intended to assess, principle by principle, a State’s current implementation of
the business and human rights framework, highlighting current legal and policy
developments and illustrating gaps that the NAP’s content should address.6
Over thirty-five countries have committed to promulgating a NAP, and of
those, seven have already completed the process.7 As countries begin taking
stock of existing legislative and voluntary measures related to regulating busi-
ness impacts on human rights, it is increasingly important to analyze the ef-
fects of a growing trend in corporate accountability—the “B Corp” movement.
The B Corp movement began in 2006 with the work of B Lab, a U.S.-based
non-profit.8 B Lab promotes three interrelated initiatives: (1) certifying com-
panies as “B Corps”; (2) lobbying for benefit corporation legislation; and (3)
managing a social impact reporting platform and database.9 B Corps are certi-
fied by B Lab based on “social and environmental performance, accountability,
and transparency” and carry with them an increasingly recognizable designation
as a business dedicated to doing better.10 B Corps also continue to propagate,
through their legal form, however, the shareholder wealth maximization norm—
reinforcing what many human rights activists see as an unsavory dichotomy be-
tween B Corps and ordinary corporations, which helps non-B Corps undermine
the corporate accountability movement as a whole.
Nonetheless, the B Corp movement continues to expand, garner widespread
support, and gain popularity and visibility. Presently, there are over a thousand
3 Id.
4 U.N. Human Rights Council, 23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/32, ¶ 5 (Mar. 14, 2013).
5 The Danish Institute for Human Rights [DIHR] & The International Corporate Accountabil-
ity Roundtable (ICAR), National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the
Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights
Frameworks, 16–17 (2014) [hereinafter NAPs Toolkit].
6 Id.
7 See National Action Plans, Business & Human Rights Resource Center,
http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-
examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-
plans (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). Although the Spanish government drafted a NAP in
2014, it has yet to be approved by the Spanish Council of Ministers. State National Action
Plans, U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioners for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited
Feb. 21, 2015).
8 Our History, B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-
non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
9 The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
10 Id.
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certified B Corps from more than thirty countries.11 As the movement continues
to proliferate, and larger corporations begin expressing interest in certification,
it is important to question whether the B Corp is truly the “highest standard
for socially responsible businesses.”12 This comparison is particularly impor-
tant in relation to operative international standards and the normative effects of
the movement’s continued proliferation of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm.
This paper seeks to discuss the technical and normative implications of the B
Corp movement, focusing specifically on whether B Corp certification is a tool
States should embrace during the NAP process or a program that undercuts the
broader corporate accountability movement by failing to promote the Guiding
Principles on a high level or by allowing non-participating companies to shirk
human rights responsibilities through citation of liability risks. Part II introduces
in greater detail the Guiding Principles, discussing the history of U.N. attempts
to regulate corporate human rights impacts, the two pillars of the State duty to
protect and the corporate responsibility to respect, and the NAP process. Part
III will examine the B Corp movement in light of both its technical and nor-
mative effects on the business and human rights movement. This section will
first discuss the requirements for B Corp certification before analyzing whether
and how certification seeks to hold corporations accountable to existing human
rights standards espoused by the Guiding Principles. It will then shift focus to
the normative issues implicated by the B Corp movement, explaining the pre-
vailing arguments on both sides of the shareholder wealth maximization debate
and the norm’s effect on future proliferation of corporate consideration for hu-
man rights. Part IV concludes with the presentation of key reflections and closing
thoughts on future promotion of the B Corp movement within the NAP process.
B U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
The U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously adopted the Guiding Principles
in 2011, which have since served as the authoritative guide on the existing rights
and duties under international law that both States and corporations have to-
ward protecting, respecting, and promoting human rights. Since their adoption,
the Guiding Principles have served as a global standard for preventing and ad-
dressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity
based on three fundamental pillars: “[1] the State duty to protect against human
rights abuses by third parties; [2] the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights; and [3] greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and
non-judicial.”13 The Guiding Principles expound upon the three pillars by pro-
11 What are BCorps?, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
12 How a Business Can Change the World: A Special Report on the Innovative Business Mod-
els Social Entrepreneurs Are Inventing, INC., http://www.inc.com/magazine/20110501/how-a-
business-can-change-the-world.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
13 UN Human Rights Council Endorses Principles to Ensure Businesses Respect Human Rights,
UN News Centre (June 16, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38742#
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viding thirty-one foundational and operational principles, which further develop
and define the respective obligations and responsibilities of State and corporate
actors in relation to protecting, respecting, and promoting human rights.
B.1 The State Duty to Protect
The State duty to protect human rights is explicated in two foundational prin-
ciples. First, the State “must protect against human rights abuse within their
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This
requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.”14
Second, the State “should set out clearly the expectation that all business en-
terprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights
throughout their operations.”15 In providing operational guidance for the imple-
mentation of these key principles, the Guiding Principles state that, in meeting
its duty to protect, the State should, inter alia, ensure that “laws and policies
governing the creation and ongoing operation of business enterprises, such as
corporate law, do not constrain but enable business respect for human rights
…[p]rovide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human
rights throughout their operations,” and “[e]ncourage, and where appropriate
require, business enterprises to communicate how they address their human
rights impacts.”16 The Guiding Principles recognize that the human rights impli-
cations of corporate and securities laws, which directly shape business behavior,
are “poorly understood,” leading corporate officers to question what they are
both permitted and required to do regarding human rights.17 As such, States
should ensure that the laws and policies in this area of corporate law provide
“sufficient guidance to enable enterprises to respect human rights, with due re-
gard to the role of existing governance structures such as corporate boards.”18
Effective guidance should both indicate expected outcomes and help dissemi-
nate best practices.19 Communication and disclosure of a corporation’s human
rights impacts and policies can range from informal communications with af-
fected stakeholders to formal public reporting.20 While these communications
and disclosure requirements can be mandatory or permissive, or a mix of the
two, they are important tools for fostering respect for human rights and should
be utilized by States to do so.21
.VOYeK1PF_NU; U.N. Human Rights Council, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
14 Guiding Principles, supra note 2, princ. 1.
15 Id. at princ. 2.
16 Id. at princ. 3.
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B.2 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights
Under the second pillar of the Guiding Principles, business enterprises should re-
spect human rights, meaning they should “avoid infringing on the human rights
of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved.”22 This fundamental responsibility is espoused in five foundational
principles. The responsibility to respect human rights, a “global standard of
expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate,” applies
“regardless of size, sector, operational context, ownership, and structure.”23 It
requires that businesses undertake adequate measures for the prevention, miti-
gation, and remediation of human rights abuses and exists independently both
from a home State’s ability or willingness to uphold its duty to protect and from
compliance with national human rights laws and regulations.24 Corporations
are responsible for respecting human rights that have been internationally recog-
nized, which is understood, at a minimum, to encompass the rights expressed in
the International Bill of Human Rights (composed of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,25 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,26
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights27) and
the principles concerning fundamental rights as set out in the International La-
bor Organization’s (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.28 Under certain circumstances, however, businesses may also need to con-
sider additional human rights standards, for example, U.N. instruments that fur-
ther explicate the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, persons with
disabilities, and migrant workers.29 More specifically, the responsibility to re-
spect requires that businesses “‘(a) [a]void causing or contributing to adverse
human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts
when they occur’ and ‘(b) [s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”’30 In
order to meet this responsibility, business enterprises should establish appropri-
ate policies and processes, including: “(a) [a] policy commitment to meet their
responsibilities to respect human rights; (b) [a] human rights due—diligence pro-
cess to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts
on human rights; and (c) [p]rocesses to enable the remediation of any adverse
22 Id. at princ. 11.
23 Id. at princ. 11 cmt.; id. at princ. 14.
24 Id. at princ. 11 cmt.
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948).
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into forceMar. 23, 1976.
27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976.
28 International Labour Organization, 88th Sess., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work (1998).
29 Guiding Principles, supra note 2, princ. 12 cmt.
30 Id. at princ. 13.
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human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.”31 The Guiding
Principles also lay out nine operational principles to provide more context and
direction to the implementation of appropriate policies and processes, which will
be reviewed in further detail in Part III.
B.3 Access to Remedy
Encompassed in the third pillar is the need for States to take appropriate steps to
ensure “through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means”
that those affected by corporate human rights abuses occurring within their ju-
risdiction have access to effective remedies.32 This remedy requirement can be ef-
fectuated both procedurally and substantively through either State-based judicial
or non-judicial mechanisms or non-State-based grievance mechanisms.33 While
States have a duty to ensure access to effective remedy through state-basedmeans
and to facilitate access to non-State grievance processes, businesses should also
establish or participate in “effective operational-level grievance mechanisms” to
address complaints early and remedy them directly, if possible.34 Operational
grievance mechanisms are accessible directly by affected individuals or commu-
nities and are usually administered, at least in part, by the businesses implicated
in the grievance. These mechanisms provide affected persons with the ability to
engage the business directly. Grievances need not equate to human rights abuse
to access these operational-level mechanisms; as such, these mechanisms can be
useful tools in deescalating disputes and abuses.35 Additionally, according to the
Guiding Principles, “industry, multi–stakeholder and other collaborative initia-
tives that are based on respect for human rights–related standards should ensure
that effective grievance mechanisms are available.”36
B.4 National Action Plans
A promising means for implementation of the Guiding Principles is the creation
by each State of a NAP. While the Guiding Principles are universally applicable,
they are not a one-size-fits-all approach, “simply to be taken off the shelf and
plugged in.”37 Instead, they must be operationalized by each State according to
its own unique political, economic, and social situation. Following the adoption
31 Id. at princ. 15.
32 Id. at princ. 25.
33 Id. at princ. 25–27. & cmt.
34 Id. at princ. 29.
35 Id. at princ. 29 & cmt.
36 Id. at princ. 30.
37 Id. ¶ 15; see also id. at ¶ 14 (As Ruggie expressed in his presentation to the Human Rights
Council of the Guiding Principles, the principles’ “normative contribution lies not in the creation
of the new international law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards
and practices for States and businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent and
comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be
improved.”).
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of the Guiding Principles,38 the U.N.HumanRights Council established the U.N.
Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises (Working Group) to, inter alia, promote the “ef-
fective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation” of the Guiding
Principles. In upholding its mandate, the Working Group has encouraged States
to develop NAPs in the field of business and human rights as a means of accel-
erating implementation.39 Furthermore, the U.N. Human Rights Council itself
called on all Member States to develop NAPs in a June 2014 resolution.40 In
this context, an NAP is defined as “an evolving policy strategy developed by a
State to protect against adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises
in conformity with the U.N. Guiding Principles.”41 Its fundamental purpose is
to strengthen the prevention of and protection against human rights abuses by
corporations through “an inclusive process of identifying needs and gaps and
practical and actionable policy measures and goals.”42
Many States have committed to or completed an NAP since early calls for
their creation in 2013. As of October 2015, seven States have completedNAPs.43
An additional twenty-eight States have officially committed to developing NAPs,
and are in differing stages of completion, while in an additional six States, civil
society or national human rights institutions have begun the drafting processes
without official State commitment.44 While important information can be gleaned
from these early NAPs regarding how States approach their duty to ensure that
corporations respect human rights in their operations (as will analyzed later in
this paper), many of these first cut NAPs received substantial criticism, in part
for not taking adequate stock of the existing legal and regulatory frameworks
in each country.45 According to the available guidance on the development of
38 Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.
aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
39 U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 4.
40 G.A. Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 (July 15, 2014).
41 U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National Action
Plans on Business and Human Rights, ii (2014) [hereinafter Working Group Guidance]; See also
NAPs Toolkit, supra note 5.
42 U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, Note by the Sec’y General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/69/263 (Aug. 5, 2014).
43 National Action Plans, supra note 7.
44 Id., supra note 7 (The State governments committed to developing NAPs include: Argentina,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,
Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nor-
way, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. Civil society or national
human rights institutions in Ghana, Poland, Kazakhstan, South Africa, South Korea and Tanzania
have also begun drafting NAPs).
45 See generally Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, Advice: Response to the Na-
tional Action Plan on Business and Human Rights “Knowing and Showing” (2014); Core,
Good Business? Analysis of the UK Government Action Plan on Business & Human Rights
(2013); International Corporate Accountability Roundtable & European Coalition for
Corporate Justice, Assessment of Existing National Action Plans (NAPs) on Business and
Human Rights (2014); Damiano de Felica & Andreas Graf, The Potential of National Action Plans
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NAPs,46 an important initial step in the creation of an NAP is the completion
of a National Baseline Assessment (NBA) of the State’s current implementation
of business and human rights frameworks. As such, the NBA is a useful tool for
evaluating a State’s current application of the Guiding Principles and identify-
ing gaps in both State and business implementation. They are seen by many as
a prerequisite to the successful development and implementation of an NAP.47
As part of the NBA, governments are advised to outline the applicable laws,
regulations, and policies in relation to each Guiding Principle.48 However, un-
like internal mapping done by State agencies, which a few early NAPs relied on,
NBAs should proceed with heavy, but thoughtful and transparent, stakeholder
consultation.49 By interfacing with, inter alia, businesses, civil society, and in-
ternational and regional actors, governments are more likely to be attuned to
the successes and challenges faced by business and human rights stakeholders,
whose rights and responsibilities are directly affected by the Guiding Principles.
C The B Corp Movement’s Technical and Normative Implications in
Relation to the U.N. Guiding Principles
With input from non-governmental actors, including business and civil society,
playing a key role in NAPs processes, it is important to keep a critical eye on
trends and developments within the business and human rights context. In a
world increasingly concerned with the human rights impacts of corporate ac-
tors, attempts at social entrepreneurship have proliferated widely and rapidly.
One of the fastest expanding movements in this realm has been the invention
of corporate forms that explicitly allow for or require consideration of social
and/or environmental issues in corporate board decision-making.50 This move-
ment is seen most prominently in the United States with the recent burgeoning
of benefit corporation legislation and, on a global level, with the spread of the
B Corp movement from the United States to more than thirty countries.51 As
the B Corp movement becomes increasingly attractive to corporate actors who
wish to integrate social and environmental concerns into their bottom line, it is
to Implement Human Rights Norms: An Early Assessment with Respect to the UN Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights, 7 J. Human Rts. Pract. 40 (2015).
46 NAPs Toolkit, supra note 5; Working Group Guidance, supra note 51. The U.N. Working
Group and civil society have both created in depth guidance for countries developing NAPs. The
ICAR/DIHR Toolkit is a leading document on the State development, implementation and review of
NAPs in the business and human rights context. For up to date information regarding the toolkits
developments and road-testing, see National Action Plans, International Corporate Account-
ability Roundtable, http://www.icar.ngo/initiatives/national-action-plans/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 16, 2015).
47 NAPs Toolkit, supra note 5, at 16–17.
48 Working Group Guidance, supra note 41, at 7.
49 NAPs Toolkit, supra note 5, at 37–38; Working Group Guidance, supra note 41, at 7.
50 This includes, inter alia, the benefit corporation, social purpose corporation, and flexible pur-
pose corporation.
51 State by State Legislative Status, Benefit Corp Information Center, http://www.
benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited February 22, 2015);What
are B Corps?, supra note 11.
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important to understand how well the B Corp requirements uphold the current
international standards for corporate human rights responsibilities. Addition-
ally, regardless of the B Corp movement’s effectiveness in promoting the Guiding
Principles, a supplemental normative inquiry must be made into the effects of B
Corps’ continued propagation of the shareholder wealth maximization norm on
the business and human rights movement. Both of these queries are timely and
important, given the substantial role stakeholders should play, and increasingly
are playing, in the creation of NAPs for the implementation of the Guiding Prin-
ciples. It is critical at this juncture of B Corp proliferation, and increasing NAP
development worldwide, to take assessment of the technical and normative im-
pacts of this new corporate social responsibility movement in the business and
human rights context.
C.1 The B Corp Movement: An Overview
The B Corp movement is a fast growing and relatively new corporate social re-
sponsibility trend.52 Spearheaded by U.S.-based non-profit B Lab, the B Corp
movement is a tri-platform effort to increase business respect and support for
social and environmental rights across stakeholder groups by: (1) certifying cor-
porate dedication to high levels of social and environmental performance, ac-
countability and transparency; (2) passing benefit corporation legislation; and
(3) providing a platform for benchmarking, measuring and reporting on im-
pact.53 The following discussion will focus on B Corp certification. While future
reference will be made to the benefit corporation legislation, the third prong of
the B Lab platform focusing on analytics and impact reporting is not within the
scope of this analysis.
There are three steps to B Corp certification: (1) A corporation must meet the
performance requirements established by B Lab; (2) if the corporation meets or
exceeds the required minimum performance review score, it must meet certain
legal requirements based on its corporate structure; (3) the corporationmust sign
the B Corp Declaration and Term Sheet, and pay the appropriate fees associated
with attaining B Corp status.54
C.1.1 Performance Requirements
The first step in B Corp certification is passing the B Impact Assessment. The as-
sessment measures the overall impact of a company’s social and environmental
performance on its stakeholders based on a 200-point scale, focusing specifically
on worker, community, environmental, long–term and core impacts.55 Assess-
ment points pertinent to the business and human rights field will be discussed
52 Our History, supra, note 8.
53 The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, supra note 9.
54 See generally How to Become a B Corp, B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/
become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
55 Ryan Honeyman, The B Corp. Handbook: How to Use Business as a Force for Good
46, 54–55, 74–75, 96–97, 118–19, 138–39 (2014).
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in greater detail later in this section. The B Impact Assessment exists in multiple
variations, taking into account company size, sector, and location of primary
operation.56 Upon completion of the assessment, companies receive a B Impact
Report and a score of first impression.57 Companies next undergo an assess-
ment review with B Lab staff, where questions are clarified and answers further
refined.58 If, after the review, the company has achieved a B Impact Assessment
score of eighty or higher, it is eligible to move forward in the certification pro-
cess.59 These corporations must submit supporting documentation to B Lab to
substantiate a randomly selected subset of eight to twelve B Impact Assessment
questions previously answered in the affirmative.60 Additionally, successful cor-
porations must also complete a disclosure questionnaire aimed at assessing the
need for any further transparency or public disclosure.61 Certified B Corps are
also subject to on-site review to further corroborate the veracity of assessment
responses; ten percent of B Corps are chosen at random each year for review by
B Lab staff.62
C.1.2 Legal Requirements
In addition to performance requirements, certified B Corps must also comply
with specific legal requirements. These requirements vary based on a business’s
corporate form and location of incorporation and are meant to “bake sustain-
ability into the DNA” of a certified B Corp, in order to ensure that the corpo-
ration’s social or environmental mission “can better survive new management,
new investors, or even new ownership.”63 The ultimate goal of the legal require-
ments is to have companies adopt benefit corporations status where feasible,
and where not, to adopt analogous language into governing documents.64 The
benefit corporation, distinct from B Corp certification, is a new corporate form
that holds the dual purpose of both creating profit for its shareholders and a
“material positive impact on society and the environment.”65 Along these lines,
benefit corporations must “consider the impact of their decisions not only on
shareholders but also on workers, community and the environment.”66 Bene-
fit corporations and B Corp certification are often confused: a corporation can
be a benefit corporation without being B Corp certified, and in certain circum-
stances, to be discussed below, a corporation can be B Corp certified without
56 Performance Requirements, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/







63 Protect Your Mission, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/why-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
64 Id.
65 Quick FAQ’s, Benefit Corp InformationCenter, http://benefitcorp.net/quick-faqs
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
66 Id.
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having benefit corporation status.67 However, the legal requirements for certifi-
cation are formed around building a company that is either a benefit corporation
or as akin to one as legally possible.
The legal requirements established by B Corp are specific to companies incor-
porated in the United States; requirements for companies incorporated elsewhere
are established on an ad hoc basis with B Corp staff.68 However, an overview of
U.S. legal requirements is instructive. The requirements are as follows: corpora-
tions, including S and C corporations and for-profit cooperatives, incorporated
in states with benefit corporation legislation must adopt benefit corporation sta-
tus within either four years of the first effective date of the legislation or within
two years of certification, whichever occurs later.69 Corporations that are incor-
porated in states with constituency statutes must amend their articles of incorpo-
ration within a year of certification to reflect their commitment to taking social
and environmental impacts to stakeholders into management decisions.70 Like-
wise, limited liability companies (LLC), limited liability partnerships (LLP), and
limited partnerships (LP), regardless of the state of incorporation, must amend
their governing documents within ninety days of certification to adopt similar
commitments.71 The operative language in this regard is:
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best
interests of the [corporation/limited liability company] (the “Com-
pany”) and its members, a [director/managing member] shall not
be required to regard any interest, or the interests of any particular
group affected by such action, as a dominant or controlling interest
or factor.
He or she shall give due consideration to the following factors, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and interests of
the Company and its [shareholders/members], and the social, eco-
nomic, legal, or other effects of any action on the current and re-
tired employees, the suppliers and customers of the Company or its
subsidiaries, and the communities and society in which the Com-
pany or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the [sharehold-
ers/members], the “Stakeholders”), together with the short-term, as
67 For more information, see Benefit Corp v. Certified B Corp, Benefit Corp Infor-
mation Center, http://benefitcorp.net/what-makes-benefit-corp-different/benefit-
corp-vs-certified-b-corp (last visited, Feb. 25, 2015).
68 Ad hoc determinations exist for all countries outside the United States, except for Canada.Cor-
porate Legal Roadmap, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Feb. 25,
2015). Canadian corporations are asked to amend their articles of incorporation to adopt language
giving the corporation the same operative effect as benefit corporation status. However, amending
articles of incorporation are seen as a “fundamental change” under Canadian law, and therefore
must be accompanied by a “special resolution” by the shareholders. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 LLC Legal Roadmap, B Corporation, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-
b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/llc-legal-roadmap (last visited Feb. 25,
2015).
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well as long-term, interests of its [shareholders/members] and the ef-
fect of the Company’s operations (and its subsidiaries’ operations)
on the environment and the economy of the state, the region, and
the nation.72
However, in cases where the state has both benefit corporation legislation and a
constituency statute, a corporation must either adopt benefit corporation status
within two years or amend its articles as explained above within one year of
certification.73 In states where neither benefit corporation legislation nor con-
stituency statutes exist, corporations must build the B Corp language into the B
Corp Term Sheet to the best of their legal ability.74 This includes: (1) commit-
ting to “consider stakeholders to the extent possible within the current corporate
laws” of the state; (2) supporting benefit corporation legislation adopted within
the state; and (3) adopting benefit corporation status within four years of the
first effective date of legislation or within two years of certification, whichever
occurs later.75
According to B Lab, the benefits of adopting these legal requirements are
threefold; they “(1) give legal protection to directors and officers to consider the
interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, when making decisions; (2)
create additional rights for shareholders to hold directors and officers account-
able to consider these interests; [and] (3) limit these expanded rights to share-
holders exclusively.”76 The normative implications of these presumed benefits,
specifically the concept of conferring legal protection to directors and officers
regarding corporate decision-making, will be further analyzed below.
C.1.3 Administrative Requirements
Once a corporation has passed the performance review and undertakes imple-
mentation of necessary legal requirements, it is ready to be certified as a B Corp.
Corporations must sign the B Corp Declaration of Interdependence and Term
Sheet and pay annual fees to B Lab to finalize B Corp status.77 The Declara-
tion of Interdependence, signed by a director or officer of the corporation as a
“symbol of…commitment to…shared collective purpose,” recognizes, inter alia,
that “all business ought to be conducted as if people and place mattered” and
“that, through their products, practices, and profits, businesses should aspire to
do no harm and benefit all.”78 The Term Sheet, which varies slightly depend-
72 Id.
73 Id; Corporate Legal Roadmap, supra note 68.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Protect Your Mission, supra note 63.
77 Make it Official, B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
78 See, e.g., Term Sheet for Certified B Corporation (for corporations in states that
do not have constituency statutes where benefit corporation is available), B Corpora-
tion, 2, 5 https://www.bcorporation.net/sites/default/files/documents/term_sheets/
B%20Corp%20Term%20Sheet%20-%20Non%20Constituency%20Benefit%20States-1.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 23, 2015).
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ing on the subsection of legal requirements that must be attained, sets out the
general terms of initial certification and certification maintenance.79 In addition,
certified B Corps must pay annual fees based on a tiered structure according to
annual sales.80 Certification is granted for two years terms, after which, compa-
nies must re-certify using the same process required in initial certification.81
C.2 B Corp Certification and the Guiding Principles
Do B Corps conform to and fulfill the requirements of the Guiding Principles?
In order to answer this question, a review of the overlay between the B Corp
certification requirements and the Guiding Principles is essential. As introduced
earlier, in order to uphold the corporate responsibility to respect, businesses
should establish, at a minimum, the following three mechanisms: (1) a policy
commitment to respect human rights; (2) a “human rights due–diligence process
to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on
human rights”; and (3) processes enabling remediation of adverse human rights
impacts caused or contributed to by the business.82
C.2.1 Policy Commitment
According to the Guiding Principles, businesses should express their commit-
ment to upholding their responsibility to respect human rights by adopting a
policy statement that:
(a) Is approved at the most senior level of the business enterprise;
(b) Is informed by relevant internal and/or external expertise; (c)
Stipulates the enterprise’s human rights expectations of personnel,
business partners and other parties directly linked to its operations,
products or services; (d) Is publicly available and communicated in-
ternally and externally to all personnel, business partners and other
relevant parties; [and] (e) Is reflected in operational policies and pro-
cedures necessary to embed it throughout the business enterprise.83
In doing so, businesses should “strive for coherence between their responsibil-
ity to respect human rights and other policies and procedures that govern their
wider business activities and relationships.”84
B Lab requires that all corporations adopt benefit corporation status or lan-
guage into governing documents akin to the dual aims expressed and protected
by such status.85 All B Corps must commit to considering “social, economic, le-
gal, or other effects of any action on . …employees, the suppliers, and customers
79 See, e.g., id.
80 Make it Official, supra note 77.
81 Performance Requirements, supra note 56.
82 Guiding Principles, supra note 2, at princ. 15.
83 Id. at princ. 16.
84 Id. at princ. 16 cmt.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 63–74.
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of the Company or its subsidiaries, and the communities and society in which the
Company or its subsidiaries operate” in their decision–making process.86 This
requirement partially fulfills the Guiding Principles’ prescription for respect. The
commitment made through benefit corporation status or an amendment to gov-
erning documents is approved at the most senior level and is publicly available
and widely communicated. However, the policy commitment required by B Corp
certification does not go as far in protecting human rights as the Guiding Prin-
ciples advise. Corporations are only asked to consider the social and economic
effects of their actions on stakeholders; they need not respect any rights of these
stakeholders. Admittedly, the breadth of the Guiding Principles does not align
completely with the more narrow scope of corporate articles of incorporation;
however, the B Impact Assessment inquires further into a corporate policy to re-
spect. The assessment allocates quality points to corporations for the following
policy actions:
• [I]ntegrat[ing] a commitment to social and/or environmental responsibility
into…written corporate mission statement.
• [T]rain[ing] employees on . …social and/or environmental mission.
• [E]valuat[ing] employees and management on their performance with re-
gard to [the] company’s social and environmental targets.
• [Tying] social and environmental performance to bonuses or other re-
wards.
• S]olicit[ing] from . …external stakeholders (e.g. customers, community
members, suppliers or nonprofit organizations) feedback about [the] com-
pany’s social and environmental performance.
• [M]aintain[ing] a board of directors (or other governing body) that meets
regularly, has at least one independent outside member, reviews the com-
pany’s social and environmental performance, and oversees executive com-
pensation.
• [P]roduc[ing] an external annual report detailing . …mission-related per-
formance.87
These policy preferences map directly onto the Guiding Principles guidance
on policy commitments. Not only is the social and environmental policy writ-
ten into the corporate mission, it is informed by external stakeholder views, is
86 See supra text accompanying note 71.
87 Honeyman, supra note 55, at 118–19. The B Impact Assessment queries used in this anal-
ysis are drawn from the Quick Assessment sections of the B Corp Handbook due to restrictions
on material for personal use. Terms of Use, B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/
terms-of-use (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). The actual B Impact Assessment is available online
in both quick assessment and full form. B Impact Assessment, B Impact Assessment, http:
//bimpactassessment.net/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Impact Assessment questionnaires also
vary depending on sector and industry. Create Your Free Account, B Impact Assessment, http:
//b-lab.force.com/bcorp/AssessmentRegistration?p=clear (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
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publicly available, and is impressed upon personnel and reflected in practice as
seen by the evaluation and reward structure based upon employee compliance.
While a corporation in not required to fulfill any of these policies in order to
receive certification, except for implementation of the legal requirements, it is
encouraged to adopt them through the B Corp system, making it a useful tool
in the promotion of the policy aspect of the corporate responsibility to respect.
C.2.2 Due Diligence Process
Another key component in a corporation’s respect for human rights, according
to the Guiding Principles, is the implementation of a due diligence mechanism
aimed at identifying, preventing, and mitigating adverse human rights impacts
cause by a business entity, its subsidiaries, or others with whom it has a business
relationship.88 This process should include “assessing actual and potential hu-
man rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses,
and communicating how impacts are addressed.”89 In order to evaluate human
rights risks, businesses should “identify and assess any actual or potential ad-
verse human rights impacts with which they may be involved” by drawing on
internal or external human rights experts and meaningful consultations with
potentially affected stakeholders.90 In verifying “whether adverse human rights
impacts are being addressed, businesses should track the effectiveness of their
response” by basing appraisal on “appropriate qualitative and quantitative in-
dicators” and drawing on feedback from internal and external sources, including
involved stakeholders.91 Businesses should periodically communicate externally
on the steps undertaken to respond to and mitigate adverse human rights im-
pacts.92
Certain aspects of this due diligence requirement are fulfilled by the assess-
ment components in the B Impact Assessment’s questionnaire, including:
• Conduct[ing] an annual environmental audit of . . . energy, water and
waste efficiency.
• Mak[ing] the results of the environmental audit transparent to the public.
• Encourag[ing] suppliers to start their own environmental reviews or au-
dits, which may cover energy, water, waste, carbon emissions, renewables,
or materials.
• Publicly disclos[ing] the social and environmental performance of your
suppliers.
• Hav[ing] an employee committee to monitor and advise on occupational
health and safety.
88 Guiding Principles, supra note 2, princ. 17.
89 Id.
90 Id. at princ. 18.
91 Id. at princ. 20.
92 Id. at princ. 21
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• Conduct[ing] regular, anonymousworker satisfaction and engagement sur-
veys.
• Review[ing] a compensation study for your industry to determine whether
you are paying above–market, market, or below–market.93
The Guiding Principles call on corporations to respect, at a minimum, the
human rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights and ILO Dec-
laration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.94 Some of the quality
point considerations listed above, if implemented by a B Corp, help uphold this
respect through due diligence processes. Audit requirements, employee monitor-
ing committees, worker surveys, and compensation reviews all aid the company
in assessing actual and potential human rights impacts. Similarly, the use of em-
ployee committees and anonymous surveys, in addition to publicly disclosing
and making transparent the results of company and supplier environmental au-
dits, help guide due diligence processes by ensuring both internal and external
consultation and feedback.
However, the scope of the B Corp requirements for certification are severely
limited in covering holistically the due diligence requirements of the Guiding
Principles, in that they only cover specific issues in environmental and labor
law. While multiple human rights encompassed in the Guiding Principles pro-
tective ambit can be implicated in environmental and labor rights violations,
many additional key human rights are not protected in the due diligence context
of the B Corp certification process, i.e. the right to life, right to property, right
to standard of living adequate for health and well-being.
C.2.3 Remediation Processes
According to the Guiding Principles, where businesses identify that they have
caused or contributed to human rights violations, they should either provide
for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes.95 Here, B
Corp certification makes no inquiry into the remediation mechanisms in place
to address a company’s adverse human rights impacts—a troubling shortcoming
of the B Corp as a model of Guiding Principle implementation.
C.2.4 Conclusion
The B Corp Declaration of Interdependence, which all B Corps sign at certifi-
cation, declares: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: That we must be the
change we seek in the world; That all business ought to be conducted as if people
and place mattered; That, through their products, practices, and profits, busi-
nesses should aspire to do no harm and benefit all.”96 While the B Corp move-
ment does not hold itself out to be in line with an implementation of the Guiding
93 Honeyman, supra note 55, at 96–97, 75, 54–55.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 41–44
95 Guiding Principle, supra note 2, at princ. 22.
96 Term Sheet, supra note 78.
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Principles’ corporate responsibility to respect pillar, many view it as an answer
to the business and human rights problem, in part due to the lofty rhetoric within
and surrounding the movement. Many have praised the movement for its pro-
gressive, altruistic nature—B Corps are a new form of business that “transcend
the contradictions between the ineffective parts of the social sector and myopic
capitalism”; they are the “highest standard for socially responsible businesses.”97
However, B Corp certification does not do enough to uphold the corporate re-
sponsibility to respect human rights as enshrined in the Guiding Principles.While
the majority of the policy commitment components of the responsibility to re-
spect are covered by the B Corp certification process, efforts at implementing due
diligence processes are limited, and attempts at installing remediation processes
are non-existent. On top of these lackluster certification requirements, businesses
seeking certification need only score positively on forty percent of the assess-
ment, and no mechanism exists to promote or mandate incremental progress on
achieving greater quality points in the biennial certification processes.98 Based
on a comparative analysis of the B Corp requirements and the Guiding Principles
corporate responsibility to respect, certification promotes inclusion of social and
environmental consideration, but does not adequately uphold the full extent of
the corporate responsibility under international law to respect human rights.
C.3 The Normative Debate Behind B Corps
Even if the B Corpmovement robustly promoted and fulfilled the Guiding Princi-
ples on corporate responsibility to respect human rights, there are still major con-
cerns regarding the movement’s normative contributions to the business and hu-
man rights debate. The major normative dispute occurring in the background of
the B Corp movement concerns the possible functional necessity of B Corp legal
requirements for corporate social responsibility practices; specifically, whether
the implementation of legal requirements allowing corporate decision-makers to
consider social and environmental consequences is necessary to protect against
liability risks.
The legal requirements behind B Corp certification require that business en-
tities either adopt benefit corporation status or the functional equivalent in their
governing documents. According to B Lab, the primary reason B Corps are re-
quired to undergo this legal reform is to “give legal protection to directors and
officers to consider the interest of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, when
making decisions.”99 It is this belief—that legal protection is necessary to shield
corporate boards from liability incurred by considering interests other than those
of the shareholders—that puts the future of sustainable and human rights com-
pliant business “in a heap of trouble.”100 If, as B Lab maintains, the legal status
97 Honeyman, Has the B Corp Movement Made a Difference?, (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.
ssireview.org/blog/entry/has_the_b_corp_movement_made_a_difference.
98 Performance Requirements, supra note 56.
99 Protect Your Mission, supra note 63.
100 Marc Gunther, Op-Ed., B Corps: Sustainability Will Be Shaped by the Market, Not Corporate
Law, TheGuardian, Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/b-
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of B Corps gives them more legal freedom to take into account social and en-
vironmental responsibilities, it follows that conventional corporations,“have no
choice but to focus narrowly on maximizing short-term profits, at the expense
of workers, communities and the planet.”101
C.3.1 The “Great Debate” Regarding Shareholder Wealth
Maximization
What are the legal obligations of a corporate board in decision-making? A num-
ber of leading scholars argue that shareholder wealth maximization is not only a
fundamental norm of U.S. corporate law, but also the world over.102 The prin-
ciple of shareholder wealth maximization, or the shareholder-oriented model,
holds that ultimate control of the corporation lies with the shareholders, and
“the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to man-
age the corporation in the interests of its shareholders; [and that] other cor-
porate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers,
should have their interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather
than through participation in corporate governance.”103 This viewpoint rose to
prominence not only due to its attractiveness to the business world, but also in
large part to the classic 1919 case Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., in which the court
famously stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.104
More recently, in 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court breathed additional life
into the shareholder wealth maximization theory with its holding in Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., which held, in short, that an un–
conflicted board in the process of taking a corporation private was liable to
shareholders for failing to maximize shareholder value.105 Indeed, Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, continues to maintain “American
corporate lawmakes corporatemanagers accountable to only one constituency—
stockholders”106 As the most influential corporate law jurisdiction in the United
corps-markets-corporate-law.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
Geo. L. J. 439, 439 (2001).
103 Id. at 440–41.
104 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
105 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
106 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to “Do The Right Thing?” 4 Harv. Bus. L.
Rev. 235, 241–42 (2014).
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States, the position of the Delaware Supreme Court regarding the shareholder
wealthmaximization’s primacy speaks volumes. However, despite the shareholder–
orientedmodel having arguably achieved international “ideological hegemony,”107
the Great Debate over the purpose and duties of the public corporation wages
on.108
Other corporate law scholars have argued that shareholder wealth maxi-
mization is “not a managerial obligation, it is a managerial choice.”109 As Lynn
Stout astutely argues in her book The Shareholder Value Myth, other than the
antiquated dicta in Dodge v. Ford, there is no other “solid legal authority to
support the proposition that the law requires directors of public corporations to
maximize shareholder value.”110 In fact, she upholds, no court has ever imposed
legal sanctions on members of corporate boards for failing to pursue one corpo-
rate purpose over another; due mainly in part to the business judgment rule.111
While executives and directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion, which bars them from making self-interested decisions, under the business
judgment rule, conflicted board members remain legally capable of pursuing any
valid corporate purpose.112 Corporate decision–makers can “safely donate cor-
porate funds to charity; reject profitable business strategies that might harm the
community; refuse risky projects that benefit shareholders at creditors’ expense
. …[S]hareholders in public companies cannot successfully sue directors sim-
ply because those directors place other stakeholders’ or society’s interests above
the shareholders’ own.”113 While the group of academics seeking to debunk the
shareholder value myth is limited to a small number of crusaders, headed by
Stout, their arguments appear to be solidly based in legal authority and histori-
cal accuracy.114 However, as bluntly stated by Jay Coen Gilbert, co-founder of
B Lab, “business leaders understandably care more about what is said by the
courts and practicing corporate attorneys than by academics.”115
C.3.2 Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Implications and
Solutions
This continuing normative debate has serious implications in the business and
human rights context. If the prevailing view holds that corporate actors can be
held legally liable for taking other considerations, such as human rights impacts,
into account in the decision-making process, directors will refuse to consider so-
107 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 102, at 468.
108 For more on the Great Debate regarding corporate purpose, see Lynn Stout, The Share-
holder Value Myth 16–23 (2013).
109 Id. at 32.
110 Id. at 27.
111 Id. at 29.
112 Id. at 43.
113 Id.
114 Jay Coen Gilbert, Op-Ed., Maximising Shareholder Profits Still Rules the Day for US Busi-
ness, The Guardian (Aug. 13, 2013; 16:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/maximising-shareholder-profits-rules-us-businesses.
115 Id.
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cial or environmental impacts, among others, without adopting some form of the
B Corp legal protections. Thus, future implementation of the corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights will be greatly hindered by possibly unnecessary
legal red tape. In other words, the prevalence of the shareholder wealth maxi-
mization principle can be used to justify a traditional corporate board’s refusal to
consider the human rights impacts of its actions for fear of liability. The Guiding
Principles’ corporate responsibility to respect is thus severely undermined by the
continuing dominance of the shareholder wealth maximization principle, and
objectives like the B Corp movement that continue to propagate it.
While the Great Debate continues in the United States regarding the valid-
ity of the shareholder wealth maximization rule, other countries have clearly
addressed the issue, therefore, alleviating the pressures faced by corporate exec-
utives to avoid liability in considering the human rights implications of board
decision-making.116 For example, Section 172 of the United Kingdom’s Compa-
nies Act of 2006 makes clear that directors of all corporations, when making
decisions regarding what actions would be “most likely to promote the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,” must consider, inter
alia, “the interest of the company’s employees”; “the impact of the company’s
operations on the community and the environment”; and “the desirability of the
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct.”117
This section also maintains that where the purposes of a company consist of
or include purposes other than solely the benefit of its members, the same social
and environmental considerations must be taken into account in deciding how to
achieve the additional purposes of the company.118 Similarly, the Dutch Corpo-
rate Governance Code adopts the view that “a company is a long-term alliance
between the various parties involved in the company” including stakeholders
such as employees, the public sector and civil society.119 As such, the manage-
ment and supervisory boards should “take account of the interests of the various
stakeholders, including corporate social responsibility issues that are relevant to
the enterprise.”120
While the normative concerns of B Corps are obviated in these two countries,
this will not always be the case. In jurisdictions where the State has not clarified
the purpose or responsibilities of public corporations, like the United States, the
B Corp movement’s continued support for the shareholder wealth maximization
norm threatens to undermine the business and human rights movement.
116 While clarifying the fiduciary duties of corporate boards in national legislation is an effective
way to cure the normative threats the B Corp model poses, this quick fix will likely be unavailable
in federal countries where individual states maintain independent corporate laws.
117 Companies Act, (c. 46, §172/2006) (Eng.); see also, HM Goverment, Government, Good
Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2013).
118 Id.
119 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, Dutch Corporate Gover-
nance Code: Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices Provisions
6 (2008); see also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, National Action Plan
on Business and Human Rights (2013).
120 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Commitee, supra note 119.
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D Conclusion
As the B Corp movement continues to proliferate, both in geographic scope and
in relation to the size and economic power of corporations seeking certifica-
tion, how businesses, governments, civil society, and other stakeholders view
the movement will have considerable impact on the future operationalization of
the Guiding Principles, in particular, whether and how the B Corp movement
will be included in future NAPs. In the current NAP process, States are asked
to take stock of existing laws, regulations, and policies that affect the corporate
responsibility to respect as part of their own duty to protect human rights. In
this regard, countries are to consult with business, civil society, and international
and regional actors in establishing the best practices and gaps in corporate social
responsibility. As stakeholder consultations proceed throughout the world, how
the B Corp movement is perceived, and whether it is ultimately supported in the
business and human rights context, can have clear detrimental impacts in the
field.
First, B Corp certification does not fully advance the corporate responsibility
to respect human rights as espoused in the Guiding Principles. While the B Corp
certification process largely covers the policy commitments recommended by the
Guiding Principles, the program is lacking in mandatory due diligence mecha-
nisms and completely fails to incorporate any sort of remediation requirements
into certification. Additionally, while the B Corp program does a good job of
covering human rights concerns within the labor and environmental law con-
texts, its strength as an overall promoter of the Guiding Principles is hindered
by this narrowed focus. This analysis is not to say that the B Corp movement
does not help technically advance certain aspects of corporate respect for hu-
man rights, which it does. It is only to warn that the B Corp movement must
not be seen as a panacea for the business and human rights problem. While the
movement may be viewed as “the highest standard for socially responsible busi-
nesses” today, this designation should not gain permanence.121 This does not
mean that a NAP should not endorse the B Corp movement, but that it must do
so with the caveat that B Corps are not the ultimate example of “human rights
respecting” corporations.
Similarly, any endorsement for the B Corp movement in a NAP should be
accompanied with an additional disclaimer regarding its normative effect on the
business conceptualization of shareholder wealth maximization. While B Corps
have not been mentioned by name in any completed NAP, a few plans clearly
address, and therefore further avoid, the normative concerns presented by the
movement. The NAPs of both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands high-
light domestic legislation that clarifies the role of the corporation as including
the requirement to take into account various stakeholder considerations when
decision–making, obviating the risk presented by the B Corp’s propagation of
the shareholder wealth maximization norm.122 However, in countries where the
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Great Debate regarding the purpose of public corporate bodies wages on, the
continued support the B Corp movement lends to the norm threatens to under-
mine the business and human rights movement. As such, any country planning
to incorporate the B Corp movement into a NAP should also be prepared to
clarify the existing standards and liability risks regarding corporate decision–
making and ideally lay out the ability of corporate boards to consider aspects
beyond shareholder wealth maximization.
In sum, in States where liability concerns for considering stakeholder effects
are removed by clarifying legislation, the B Corp movement presents itself as
a useful tool in promoting certain aspects of the corporate responsibility to re-
spect, though not to the full extent recommended by the Guiding Principles.
However, in States where corporate purpose has not been clarified, or where
the shareholder–oriented model has prevailed, the normative risks the B Corp
movement presents arguably do not outweigh the positive effects the movement
has on implementation of the Guiding Principles’ corporate responsibility to re-
spect. The value of promoting this limited respect for certain subsets of human
rights is dwarfed by the negative consequences of continuing to maintain the
shareholder wealth maximization norm.
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